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Abstract
We present a model in which the importance of ¯nancial intermediation for develop-
ment can be measured. We generate ¯nancial di®erences by varying the degree to which
contracts can be enforced. Economies where enforcement is poor employ less capital and
less e±cient technologies. Calibrated simulations reveal that both e®ects are important.
Yet, accounting for all the observed dispersion in output requires a higher capital share
or a lower elasticity of substitution between capital and labor than usually assumed.
We ¯nd that the e®ects of changes in those technological parameters on output are
markedly larger when ¯nancial frictions are present. Finance, that is, matters.
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11 Introduction
Under standard neoclassical assumptions, observed di®erences in human and physical capital
per worker cannot account for di®erences in output per worker across nations.1 In the language
of development accounting, total factor productivity (TFP) varies greatly across countries.
At the same time, ¯nancial development and economic development are highly correlated.2
This strong empirical relationship is often presented as evidence that ¯nancial development
causes economic development by promoting investment and making the allocation of resources
more e±cient. A number of models have established a theoretical link between ¯nance and
development.3 Our goal is to quantify the importance of ¯nance for economic development
in a dynamic general equilibrium model.4
In our model economy agents live for three periods, but only work in the ¯rst two. When
young, they supply labor inelastically. In the second period of their life they can choose to
manage a technology that transforms capital and labor into the consumption good. As in the
span of control model of Lucas (1978), some agents manage resources more e±ciently than
others. Managers ¯nance part of their capital through their own savings, and borrow the rest
from an intermediary. The market for loans is imperfect however, as agents can choose to
default on the payment they owe the intermediary at an exogenous cost.5
This default cost is the basis for the quantitative exercise we carry out in this paper. In
all our experiments, we compare economies that di®er in one respect only: the degree to
which ¯nancial contracts can be enforced. By generating ¯nancial di®erences via enforcement
1See for example Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1997), Prescott (1998), or Hall and Jones (1999).
2See for example Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973), Rajan and Zingales (1998), or Beck,
Levine, and Loayza (2000).
3See for example Boyd and Prescott (1986) and Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), or Aghion, Howitt, and
Mayer-Foulkes (2005), for a connection between ¯nance and growth.
4Using data from Thailand, Jeong and Townsend (2004) ¯nd that capital deepening is an important
determinant of measured TFP growth. Models that quantify the importance of factors other than ¯nance
include Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), Restuccia and Rogerson (2003), Herrendorf
and Teixeira (2004), and Restuccia (2004).
5In order to understand a number of corporate ¯nance regularities, Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) build a
model economy that bears some similarities to ours. Not only their focus is di®erent, but also their results
are theoretical, not quantitative.
2frictions, we adopt and formalize the view that the quality of institutions is a key determinant
of ¯nancial development. Economies where contract enforcement is poor emphasize self-
¯nancing and, therefore, production on a small scale. Less productive technologies need to be
operated for labor markets to clear. Output is lower in economies with bad ¯nancial markets
because less capital is used in production (the capital intensity channel), and because capital
is not directed to its best uses (the allocation channel). In other words, our model incorporates
the two channels emphasized by the ¯nancial development literature ever since the seminal
work of Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973), and Shaw (1973).
To quantify the importance of these e®ects, we begin by calibrating our model to match
relevant features of the U.S. economy. In particular, we calibrate the distribution of manage-
rial talent to match salient features of the organization of production in the United States,
and the default cost to approximate the ratio of aggregate ¯nancial liabilities to output. Then
we vary the default parameter to generate a sequence of economies with di®erent levels of
¯nancial development.
We ¯nd that ¯nance disrupts the organization of production greatly. As access to ¯nance
falls, more agents need to become managers for labor markets to clear (more ine±cient tech-
nologies need to be activated), and the average size of establishments falls by magnitudes very
similar to what one observes in the available cross-country data. We also ¯nd that ¯nancial
di®erences have a large impact on capital-output ratios, and can generate output variations
that far exceed what di®erences in these capital-output ratios alone would predict. That is,
we ¯nd that both the allocation and the capital intensity channels emphasized by the liter-
ature on ¯nancial development are quantitatively important. Despite that, under standard
technological assumptions, the resulting dispersion in output falls short of what one observes
in the data.
These results are robust to even drastic changes in most parameters, with two important
exceptions. Raising the capital share greatly increases the e®ect of ¯nance on output, for
obvious reasons. Similarly, reducing the degree to which labor can be substituted for capital
magni¯es the output e®ect without changing the impact of ¯nance on the capital-output ratio
3much. In sum, we ¯nd that the extent to which ¯nance matters depends on the importance of
physical capital in production. Under standard technological assumptions, the capital share
is too small and labor is too easy to substitute for capital for ¯nance to explain all the output
dispersion one sees in the data.
That varying those two parameters can magnify the e®ect of factor di®erences on output
is well-known. For instance, Caselli (2003) argues that if the elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor is small enough, the observed dispersion in factor endowments can account
for the dispersion in output across countries. What we ¯nd is that ¯nancial di®erences provide
a complementary magni¯cation e®ect. The e®ect on output of given changes in the elasticity
of substitution becomes much larger when one models ¯nancial frictions explicitly.
More generally, our ¯ndings con¯rm the importance of correctly measuring the parame-
ters that describe technological opportunities. For now, those parameters remain the cause
of much debate. The common motivation for assuming Cobb-Douglas technological oppor-
tunities is that factor shares are fairly constant over time in the United States, as originally
emphasized by Kaldor (1961).6 After allocating proprietor's income to capital and labor,
Gollin (2002) ¯nds that the capital share varies between 0.2 and 0.35 across countries. Jones
(2003), using cross-country and cross-industry data, ¯nds that capital shares exhibit substan-
tial trends and °uctuations. Attempts to measure the elasticity of substitution directly yield
vastly di®erent results. The results of Restuccia and Urrutia (2001) provide support for the
Cobb-Douglas speci¯cation, but a panel version of the same estimation exercise lead Pessoa,
Pessoa, and Rob (2003) to reject the Cobb-Douglas speci¯cation in favor of a an elasticity
of substitution estimate of around 0.7. Allowing for biased technical change Antrµ as (2004)
also concludes that the U.S. economy is not well described by a Cobb-Douglas aggregate
production function. Similarly, Du®y and Pappageorgiou (2000) reject the Cobb-Douglas
speci¯cation in a sample of 82 countries, and ¯nd in addition that the elasticity of substitu-
tion between capital and labor rises with the level of economic development. Our point in
this paper is not to settle these empirical questions, but rather to stress their importance.
6A di®erent motivation, based on the distribution of new ideas, is provided in Jones (2005).
4Whether ¯nancial disruptions can account for the bulk of the output variation we observe in
the data hinges on the outcome of this debate over factor shares and elasticities.
In sum, our experiments suggest that ¯nancial development matters a great deal for eco-
nomic development. Standard models cannot account for observed output di®erences given
observed capital intensity di®erences. Contractual imperfections in the market for ¯nance
may be the needed magni¯cation channel.
2 The economy
We consider a discrete-time model in which a mass one of 3-period-lived agents are born each
period. Agents are endowed with managerial ability z 2 Z which is public information. The
distribution ¹ of managerial ability is the same across generations and has ¯nite support. In
the ¯rst period of their life agents inelastically supply one unit of labor services. In the second
period, they can once again supply labor services or, instead, can choose to become managers.
Managers of ability z transform inputs l > 0 of labor services and k > 0 of physical capital
into the unique consumption good according to the following gross schedule:
F(l;k;z) = Az [®k
½ + (1 ¡ ®)l
½]
º
½ + (1 ¡ ±)k;
where A > 0, ® 2 (0;1), º < 1 to allow for managerial pro¯ts,7 ½ 2 (¡1;1] measures
the degree to which capital and labor can be substituted for each other, and ± 2 (0;1) is
the rate of depreciation of physical capital. In the last period of their life, agents do not
work. Agents' preferences over lifetime consumption pro¯les (c1;c2;c3) are represented by the
following utility function:
U(c1;c2;c3) = logc1 + ¯ logc2 + ¯
2 logc3;
7Even though the plant technology is strictly concave in labor services and capital, aggregate returns
are constant in this economy. There are three inputs in our economy: managerial services, labor services
and capital. Doubling population, all else equal, doubles the number of potential workers and managers. If
population and the capital stock both double, so does output.
5where ¯ 2 (0;1).
Managers can self-¯nance part of their capital using savings from the ¯rst period of their
life. We denote by s the capital so invested by managers. They can also borrow d ¸ 0 from an
intermediary. In addition to extending loans to managers, the intermediary can store deposits
on behalf of agents with exogenous net return r > 0, and can borrow without bound at that
same rate. We will think of the resources invested in the storage technology as capital not used
in production. In this broad sense, these resources include savings hoarded by households,
and residential investment. The assumption that the intermediary can borrow at rate r is
made for simplicity. Investment in the storage technology is positive in all our simulations
given the calibration choices we make in the quantitative section.8
Let w denote the price of labor services. In this paper we will only consider equilibria
where this price is constant over time. Given quantity k = s+d of physical capital, a manager
of ability z generates net income ¦(k;z;w) where
¦(k;z;w) = max
l
[F(l;k;z) ¡ wl ¡ k(1 + r)]:
The market for loans is imperfect. Speci¯cally, managers can choose to default on their loan
and economize on the payment they owe the intermediary, in which case they incur a default
cost equal to fraction ´ > 0 of their income. We further assume that the intermediary behaves
competitively, so that among the individually rational loans that cover the opportunity cost
r of funds, the most favorable to the manager prevails. Therefore, ¯nancial contracts for




s.t. ¦(s + d;z;w) + s(1 + r) ¸ (1 ¡ ´)[¦(s + d;z;w) + (s + d)(1 + r)]:
The constraint states that it must be individually rational for the managers to repay their
8Some aspects of our quantitative results are sensitive to how these activities are recorded in National
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), as we discuss in section 4.6.
6loan. Let d(a;z;´;w), s(a;z;´;w) and l(a;z;´;w) denote the policy functions associated with






When the loan market is perfect (´ = 1), managers of ability z operate with the optimal
quantity k¤(z;w) = argmaxk¸0 ¦(k;z;w) of physical capital, given the price of labor. When
´ < 1, managers are constrained to operate at a sub-optimal scale, unless their savings exceed
a¤(z;´;w) = inffa ¸ 0 : s(a;z;´;w) + d(a;z;´;w) = k¤(z;w)g. In particular, V (a;z;´;w) =
¦(k¤(z;w);z;w) for all a ¸ a¤(z;´;w). The lemma below states that below threshold a¤, the
manager's access to outside ¯nancing rises with her assets and her managerial ability. This
occurs because increases in a or z weaken the individual rationality constraint in the manager's
problem. This result also states that it is optimal for borrowing constrained managers to invest
all their savings in their establishment. This is because the marginal product of physical
capital exceeds its opportunity cost (1+r) in establishments operated at a sub-optimal scale.
Lemma 1. Given w > 0 and ´ > 0,
(i) V (¢;z;´;w) is strictly increasing and concave on [0;a¤(z;´;w)) for all z 2 Z;
(ii) V (a;¢;´;w) rises strictly for all a > 0;
(iii) s(a;z;´;w) = a on [0;a¤(z;´;w)) for all z 2 Z;
(iv) d(¢;z;´;w) is strictly increasing and concave on [0;a¤(z;´;w)) for all z 2 Z;
(v) d(a;¢;´;w) is increasing for all a 2 [0;a¤(z;´;w)).
This result is established in the appendix. It implies that limited enforcement disrupts the
allocation of resources in potentially two ways. First, establishments are generally operated
below their optimal scale. Second, occupational choices depend not only on agents' man-
agerial ability, but also on their wealth. But we will now argue that even when contractual
imperfections are present, occupational choices are monotonic in ability: agents whose ability
7exceeds a certain threshold become managers in the second period, while agents below that
threshold remain workers.9 To that end, we need to state the problem solved by young agents:
max
a1;a2¸0
logc1 + ¯ logc2 + ¯
2 logc3
s.t. c1 + a1 = w




c3 = a2(1 + r):
Solutions to this maximization problem need not be unique. Indeed, when w = V (a1;z;´;w),
agents are indi®erent between the two possible occupations in the second period. But the
level k(z;´;w) with which managers of ability z operate is unique. To see this, recall that
by lemma 1, V is strictly concave in a below a¤(z;´;w) . Therefore, agents of ability z who
become managers are either unconstrained, or solve a problem that is strictly concave in a1.
Also, note that agents are indi®erent between occupations for at most one ability value. In
fact, given w > 0 and ´ ¸ 0, there exists a unique z(´;w) such that agents become managers
in the second period of their life when z > z(´;w), remain workers when z < z(´;w), and
are indi®erent between the two occupations otherwise. If agents of a given managerial ability
¯nd that becoming a manager maximizes their lifetime utility, this remains true for agents of
higher ability. Indeed, productivity and access to outside ¯nancing both rise with managerial
ability, by lemma 1.
Given a wage rate w ¸ 0, and an enforcement parameter ´, optimal agent policies are
fully described by the threshold managerial ability z(´;w), the quantity k(z;´;w) of capital




9This simplifying result hinges on our assumption that agents are born identical. Sources of wealth
inequality that are not monotonic in managerial ability, such as bequest inequality, would yield a di®erent
outcome.
8of labor these agents choose to manage. A steady-state equilibrium is a constant wage rate w
such that, given the associated policies, the market for labor clears.10 To make this formal,
note that managers of ability z > z(´;w) have a net excess demand for labor of l(z;´;w) ¡ 1
over their lifetime, since they supply one unit of labor when young. For their part, agents
who do not become managers supply 2 units of labor during their lifetime. Agents of ability
z(´;w) can be assigned to either occupations in the second period. Each possible fraction
µ 2 [0;1] of those agents assigned to management generates a di®erent value of the aggregate
excess demand for labor. These observations lead to the following de¯nition of the excess




















¡ 2(1 ¡ µ)
¸
: µ 2 [0;1]
)
A steady state equilibrium is a value for w such that 0 2 ED(w;´). We will call a steady
state equilibrium with w > 0, hence positive output, non-degenerate. The following result
provides conditions under which non-degenerate steady-state equilibria exist:
Proposition 1. There exist ½ < 0 and ´ < 1 such that a non-degenerate steady state exists
provided:
1. ½ > ½, or,
2. ´ ¸ ´:
A non-degenerate equilibrium exists provided that labor and capital are substitutable
enough, or that the degree to which contracts can be enforced is high enough, for any given
set of other exogenous parameters. In the appendix, we argue that a non-degenerate steady-
state equilibrium exists if ED(w;´) \ I R+ 6= ; for w low enough, that is, if excess demand
10Since by assumption capital is available perfectly elastically at price 1 + r, the market for capital clears
trivially.
9becomes positive when w becomes small. We also argue that this condition is met when ½ ¸ 0
(which includes the Cobb-Douglas case, ½ = 0), but may fail to hold when ½ < 0.11
Given the calibration choices we make in section 4, we ¯nd that the economy only collapses
for extremely low values of ´ and ½. There, we use numerical simulations to compare economies
that di®er in one respect only: the degree ´ to which contracts can be enforced. Intuitively,
we should expect steady state wages to rise with the quality of enforcement. Indeed, as ´
rises more contracts become enforceable and managers' access to outside ¯nancing improves.
Managers should then operate at a scale closer to the optimal one, with a positive e®ect
on output and the marginal product of labor. One can in fact show that when ½ > ½, for
each monotonic sequence of enforcement parameters there exists a corresponding sequence
of monotonic steady state wages. The point of the remainder of this paper is to gauge the
quantitative importance of enforcement, and therefore access to ¯nance, on an economy's
output and capital intensity.
3 Data
In this section we establish the data benchmarks against which the results of the quantitative
experiments will be compared. Our principal source of data is the Penn World Table, Mark
6.1, which is described in detail in Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002). Our sample consists
of those countries that report output per worker in 1996 and report investment data for at
least 15 years leading up to 1996. This gives us a sample of 120 countries.
As a measure of output per worker we use the series RGDPW. Since the capital per
worker data (KAPW) can be somewhat unreliable, and is still unavailable at this time for
Mark 6.1, we constructed capital stock series for each country using the perpetual inventory
method. Our investment series is the product of GDP per capita in 1996 international prices
(RGDPL) and the corresponding investment share series (Ki). For the initial capital stock we
11When ½ < 0, the marginal product of capital does not diverge to +1 when k falls. As a result, for ´
small enough, managers may not be able to borrow any capital, even if w = 0.
10consider two alternative methods. Method 1 sets the initial capital stock equal to the initial
investment divided by the growth rate of investment (its geometric average over the sample)
plus the depreciation rate (which we set to 10% a year.) This is tantamount to assuming
that such an economy is on a balanced growth path in the initial period. Method 2 sets the
capital-output ratio in the initial period equal to that in the last period (1996). This is a
good approximation if the economy is close to a balanced growth path throughout the period
considered. The two methods yield capital stocks (relative to the U.S) in 1996 that are very
close to each other, so we choose the ¯rst one. Finally, we divide the capital stock in 1996,
by GDP per capita in 1996 (as given by RGDPL.) to obtain capital-output ratios.
The ¯rst chart in ¯gure 1 plots relative capital-output ratios against relative output per
worker. To calculate dispersion measures for output per capita and capital-output ratios we
divided the top decile by the bottom decile. The richest 10% are 35 times richer than the bot-
tom 10%, and have 5 times the capital-output ratio of countries in the bottom decile.12 These
numbers have prompted the literature to conclude that the dispersion in capital-output ratios
across countries cannot account for observed di®erences in output per worker.13 A standard
development accounting exercise would lead one to conclude that total factor productivity




where Y is GDP, K is aggregate capital, L is aggregate labor, and ® is the capital share. As-
suming ® = 0:3 for our sample of 120 countries, the richest 10% have a measured productivity
9.5 times higher than the bottom 10%. This statistic does not have the usual interpretation
in our model economy, since aggregate technological opportunities are not well described by
a Cobb-Douglas speci¯cation unless ½ = 0. Nonetheless, we report it in all quantitative
12Hsieh and Klenow (2004) ¯nd that if one uses domestic prices, the dispersion in investment rates across
countries is even smaller.
13This remains true even if one accounts for human capital. See for example Prescott (1998) and Hall and
Jones (1999).
11experiments so that our simulated numbers can be compared to the outcome of standard
development accounting exercises.
Measuring the quantity of ¯nancial intermediation in a given economy is a more compli-
cated issue. There is a large literature that studies the statistical relationship between proxies
for ¯nancial intermediation and growth or development.14 The ideal proxy would measure the
ability of a manager to obtain ¯nancing for a project. In our model economy, outside capital
is the part of capital that does not come from managers' savings, the variable we termed d in
the previous section. Given the set of ¯nancial statistics that are available for a reasonably
large cross-section of nations, we believe the best proxy to be the sum of: (i) the credit ¯rms
obtain from banks and other ¯nancial institutions (ii) the credit they obtain from issuing
bonds, and, (iii) the funds they obtain from issuing stock. The database compiled by Beck,
Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine15 contains (i), and a market value measure of (ii) and (iii), which
we use for lack of historical value numbers. Whether historical valuations of outstanding
stocks are more appropriate than market valuations is not obvious, however. Stock values
re°ect in part the value of retained earnings. These are funds which corporations e®ectively
borrow from their shareholders.
The average ratio of outside capital (so de¯ned) to output in the United States during the
1980's and 1990's is roughly 2. This is the number we use in our calibrated simulations. Using
unrelated data and a di®erent methodology, McGrattan and Prescott (2000) arrive at a ratio
of 1.8 for the year 2000. Their number is smaller in part because they ignore corporate debt
holdings and liabilities. Figure 1 shows relative output, relative capital-output ratios, and
relative measured productivity plotted against the outside capital to output ratio relative to
the U.S. for 25 countries.16 As is well known, the quantity of ¯nance, the level of development,
capital-output ratios, and total factor productivity measures are all positively correlated.
14See, for example, Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000).
15This database is available at http://legacy.csom.umn.edu/WWWPages/FACULTY/RLevine/Index.html
16These are the 25 countries that report data for items (i), (ii), and (iii). The country with the smallest
outside capital to output ratio relative to the U.S in this sample is Argentina, at 0.1, while the one with the
highest is Japan at 1.24.
124 Quantitative Experiments
In our model economy, ¯nance a®ects development in two ways. First, economies with better
¯nancial markets employ more capital. Henceforth, we refer to this e®ect as the capital inten-
sity channel. Second, they direct capital to more e±cient uses (more productive plants), an
e®ect we refer to as the allocation channel. In this section we conduct a series of experiments
to measure the quantitative importance of these two channels, and to ¯nd out whether ¯nan-
cial di®erences can account for observed di®erences in income per worker across countries. We
are particularly interested in asking whether the model can generate these sizable di®erences
in output while keeping the di®erences in capital-output ratios small.
4.1 Calibration
We begin by setting parameters to match salient features of the U.S. economy. Assuming
that an individual's work life lasts 40 years, a period in the model economy corresponds to 20
years. We set the yearly interest rate to 4% (r = 1:0420 ¡ 1), and then set ¯ = 1
1+r = 0:4564.
We set ± = 0:88, which implies that yearly depreciation is 10%.
To calibrate the parameters governing the production function we ¯rst assume an elasticity
of substitution of ¾ = 1
1¡½ = 1. In that case, F(l;k;z) = Azk®ºn(1¡®)º +(1¡±)k. When there




Here, K denotes the sum across plants of all capital, i.e.
R 1
z (s(a;z;´;w) + d(a;z;´;w))d¹.
That is, we begin by assuming that the resources invested in the storage technology are not
reported as investment in National Income and Product Accounts. Under that assumption,
the sum of all capital used by managers is the proper counterpart in our model to the measure
of the capital stock we introduced in the data section. In all our simulations, aggregate
17Although below we calibrate ´ to a value lower than one in the U.S., the capital share does not fall much
from its complete market benchmark. Speci¯cally, we calibrate ´ to match a loans to yearly GDP ratio of 2.
This means the capital to GDP ratio must then exceed 2, which in turn implies the capital share must exceed
28%, 2 times the yearly values of r + ±.
13savings, S ´
R
(a1(z;´;w) + a2(z;´;w))d¹, exceed K so that some resources are invested
in the storage technology. Subsection 4.6 discusses the impact of treating S ¡ K as part of
capital formation.
Gollin (2002) ¯nds that the share of capital income in GDP varies between 0.2 and 0.35 in
most countries. We set ®º = 0:3. Another condition is necessary to identify ® and º. Absent
contractual imperfections, 1 ¡ º measures the share of income that accrues to managerial
services. One way to set this share could be to set it equal to the share of proprietors' income
in national income, but this measure would not be consistent with our theory. We think
of F as an establishment technology, and our model does not distinguish between forms of
ownership. In that sense, aggregate returns to managerial services should include the income
of managers who operate an establishment on behalf of a corporation. Since corporate data do
not allow one to measure the share of income that accrues to managerial services, we assume
that the repartition of income across factors is independent of the ownership type. Under that
assumption, and under the assumption that in sole proprietorships the owner plays the role
of the manager in our model, a good proxy for the managerial share is the ratio of net income
to the sum of payments to physical capital, labor, and the owner in sole proprietorships,
after correcting for the fact that part of net income rewards the owner's capital input. Using
Internal Revenue Service data available between 1989 and 1998, we calculated that among
manufacturing sole proprietorships, in the United States, aggregate net income represents (on
average) 22% of payments to labor, capital and the owner (see appendix B.1.) Assuming that
fraction ® of net income rewards the owner's capital input, we obtain the following condition
for º and ®:
1 ¡ º = 0:22(1 ¡ ®)
The approximate solution to our two conditions on º and ® is ® = 0:35 and º = 0:85.18
The distribution of managerial talent, ¹, and the default cost, ´, are calibrated together to
18Using very di®erent arguments, Atkeson, Khan, and Ohanian (1996) arrive at the same value for the
degree of strict concavity of the plant production function. This is also the value used by Jermann and
Quadrini (2003) and Atkeson and Kehoe (2001).
14match the ratio of outside capital to GDP (calculated using the data and method described
in the previous section) and two moments of the size distribution of manufacturing estab-
lishments in the United States. Speci¯cally, we assume that z is log-normally distributed
with parameters (¸1;¸2).19 We calibrate these two parameters to match 1) the percentage
of manufacturing establishments with 9 employees or fewer, which is around 50% according
to County Business Patterns Survey data between 1988 and 1998, and 2) the average size
of manufacturing establishments in the United States, which is around 50 employees accord-
ing to the same source. This is meant to capture two salient features of the organization of
production in the United States: the majority of establishments are small, but small estab-
lishments account for a low fraction of employment. We use manufacturing data to allow for
international comparisons. Data on the organization of production outside of the manufac-
turing sector are seldom available for developing nations, and are unreliable when they exist,
given the preponderance of undeclared, informal activities in services in those countries.20
Appendix B.2 describes the joint calibration of ¸1;¸2;´ in more detail. The exact values we
used for all exogenous parameters in our experiments are in the appendix as well.
4.2 Results
Our experiments consist of comparing steady state equilibria in economies that di®er in their
degree of contractual imperfections and thus in their outside capital to output ratio. In
these comparisons, we focus on what happens to output, capital-output ratios, and measured
productivity, but we also highlight some subsidiary implications that lend credibility to the
framework we propose. Figure 2 shows the results of such an experiment in the Cobb-Douglas
case.
Not surprisingly, the model is qualitatively consistent with the empirical correlation be-
tween ¯nance, output, capital intensity, and measured productivity. The model also correctly
19This implies a distribution of establishment sizes that is approximately log-normal as well, since labor is
linear in z
1
1¡º when ´ = 1.
20Calibrating ¸1 and ¸2 to moments of the distribution of all establishments in the U.S. does not alter our
main quantitative ¯ndings. Those results are available upon request.
15predicts a positive correlation between average establishment size and the outside capital to
output ratio.21 In fact, the model's quantitative predictions for the organization of produc-
tion are very reasonable given available data. For instance, we calculate Argentina's outside
capital to GDP ratio to be 10 times lower than in the United States. The model with ¾ = 1
predicts that in such an economy the average size of establishments should be roughly 4 times
lower than in the United States (see ¯gure 2), or around 12.5 employees. According to Ar-
gentina's economic census, the average size of manufacturing establishments was around 11
employees in 1985 and 9 employees in 1993. Mexico's outside capital to GDP ratio is similar
to Argentina's. According to its economic census, manufacturing establishments counted 19
employees on average in 1988.22 Finance disrupts the organization of production in our model
by magnitudes similar to what one observes in the available data.
The model also predicts a large impact of ¯nance on capital-output ratios. It predicts that
capital-output ratios should vary proportionally to the outside capital to GDP ratio. In the
data (bottom-left graph in ¯gure 1), nations with one ¯fth the outside capital to GDP ratio
of the United States have roughly two-thirds the capital-output ratio of the United States.
In this sense, the experiment implies too much dispersion in capital-output ratios. In section
4.6, we will argue that this quantitative feature of the model is sensitive to the treatment of
resources invested in the storage technology.23 Given this dispersion in capital-output ratios,
and holding productivity constant, a standard neoclassical production function would predict
that output should vary by a factor of one to 5
®
1¡®, which is roughly 2, assuming capital share
® = 0:3. Instead, as shown in the ¯rst panel of ¯gure 2, our model predicts that output should
vary by a factor of 3.5. This additional variation owes to the resource allocation channel and
21Average establishment size is a step function of the ¯nance-to-output ratio because the distribution of
managerial talent is discrete. Jumps occur where agents of a given managerial talent become indi®erent
between becoming workers and managers in the second period of their life.
22See Tybout (2000) for more quantitative evidence on the organization of production in developing coun-
tries.
23Recall also that, for lack of ¯nancial data, ¯gure 1 excludes all the countries with less than half the
U.S. capital-output ratio. As we calculated in section 3, capital-output ratios vary by a factor of one to ¯ve
worldwide (see the top-left graph of ¯gure 1), which is exactly the dispersion in capital-output ratios predicted
by our model.
16is re°ected in the decline of measured productivity in ¯gure 2. Not only do economies with
little ¯nance operate with less capital, they also direct that capital to less productive uses.
4.3 The importance of the allocation channel
While it is instructive to compare the output variation our model generates relative to what
standard neoclassical accounting would suggest, these back-of-the-envelope calculations are
not a very good measure of the true magnitude of the allocation channel. To better gauge its
importance, consider a version of our economy in which agents all have the same managerial
talent.24 In this environment as in the benchmark environment, economies with less ¯nance
operate with less capital and more managers. But it is no longer the case that they employ
more ine±cient technologies, as all managers are equally productive. The quantitative e®ects
of ¯nance in this economy with homogenous agents are compared to the results we obtained
with heterogenous agents in the top two graphs of ¯gure 3. First, note that capital-output
ratios vary much less than before. The reason for this is somewhat subtle. Because agents are
homogenous, they must be indi®erent between working and managing in the second period
of their life (unless all agents choose to become managers in the second period, which does
not happen in any of our experiments given our calibration choices.) This means that all
managers have a °at lifetime income pro¯le. In economies with heterogenous agents on the
other hand, only marginal managers have °at income pro¯les, while other managers earn rents
and have steeper income pro¯les. Because steeper income pro¯les reduce the willingness of
managers to transfer resources into the second period, the savings rate of managers is much
higher in economies with homogenous agents than in our benchmark economy (at least twice
24Naturally, such an economy delivers very counterfactual predictions for the organization of production.
First, all establishments now have the same size. Second, and less obviously, establishments must now be small,
even when there are no contractual imperfections. To see this, note that if all agents become managers in the
second period of their life, the size of all establishments in equilibrium is one employee. Bigger establishments
arise in equilibrium if, and only if, some agents become workers in the second period of their life, while
others become managers. In that case, agents must be indi®erent between working and managing. Simple
manipulations of ¯rst-order conditions for pro¯t maximization then imply that the unique equilibrium size
in that case is bounded above by the ratio of the labor share to the managerial share, which is roughly 4
employees given our calibration choices.
17as high in all simulations given our calibration choices.) As a result, a much greater fraction
of capital is self-¯nanced in the homogenous agent case, and ¯nance has a smaller impact
on capital intensity. Speci¯cally, capital intensity now varies only by a factor of 1.65 as we
go from self-¯nancing to perfect markets. Holding everything else constant across economies,
standard neoclassical accounting would then predict that output should vary by a factor of
1:65
®
1¡® ' 1:24, given ® = 0:3. In our simulations, output turns out to vary by a factor of
1:15. In other words, without agent heterogeneity, our model generates no output dispersion
beyond the standard capital intensity channel.
Our model of ¯nance, therefore, improves upon standard development models by generat-
ing output dispersion beyond what capital intensity di®erences can explain. We ¯nd, in other
words, that the capital intensity channel and the allocation channel are both quantitatively
important. Nonetheless, the model's predictions for output dispersion falls short of what one
observes in the data. This is not surprising given that our model abstracts (among other
things) from di®erences in human capital across economies. Moreover, the importance of
¯nance for output, and our other quantitative ¯ndings, could be sensitive to our calibration
choices. We now turn to evaluating this possibility.
4.4 Sensitivity analysis
Since the managerial share is not a standard parameter, it is important to verify that our
results do not hinge on the value of º we proposed in section 4.1. Figure 4 shows the e®ect
of dropping the managerial share from 15% to 10%, and of raising it to 20%, holding the
capital share constant. It can readily be seen that this has little e®ect on results. Another
key parameter is the discount rate ¯, since it determines the willingness of agents to save for
life-cycle reasons. In particular, lowering ¯ reduces the propensity of agents to save, which
could give ¯nance a greater role. Figure 5 shows the e®ect of lowering ¯ until investment in
the storage technology in the benchmark economy is approximately zero. This drastic change
18in value has almost no noticeable e®ect on our results.25 We also veri¯ed that our results are
not sensitive to even large changes in the target for the outside capital to output ratio in the
U.S. Those results are available upon request.
Two calibration choices that, on the other hand, have a big impact on our results are
the capital share and the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. Gollin (2002)
¯nds that cross-country capital shares vary between 0.2 and 0.35. Figure 6 shows the results
for capital shares of 0:4 = 0:47 £ 0:85 and 0:2 = 0:24 £ 0:85 respectively (in the benchmark
case we used 0:3 = 0:35 £ 0:85), while managerial shares are kept constant, and labor shares
are adjusted to make up for the di®erence. The high capital share generates a dispersion in
output of magnitude 10, which is a signi¯cant improvement relative to the benchmark.
Lowering the degree of substitution between capital and labor also helps. Figure 7 shows
the e®ect of lowering ¾ to 0.75, 0.5, and 0, the Leontie® case,26 which we include here for
illustrative purposes. As the elasticity of substitution falls, the dispersion in output rises to
become comparable to what we observe in the data. Yet, the capital-output ratio dispersion
does not di®er much from that in the Cobb-Douglas case. Consequently, most of the extra
variation in output is re°ected in (naively) measured productivity, as in the data. With
elasticities of substitution between ¾ = 0:75 and ¾ = 0:5, the model can easily account for
the observed dispersion of output and measured productivity across countries.
4.5 Finance matters
That lowering the capital share and the degree to which capital and labor can be substituted
for each other leads to more variation in output is well-known (see Caselli (2003) for an
extensive discussion of this topic.) If one makes capital more important in production, a
25The symmetric experiment, setting r so that S = K given our assumed ¯ makes no signi¯cant impact
either. This experiment is of independent interest as well. It could be interpreted as a world in which the
price of capital is set by a large economy with respect to which other economies are small and open. This is
a reasonable description, for instance, of the relationship of several Latin American nations with the U.S.
26For low values of the relative outside capital-output ratio we lose some accuracy when ¾ is small, as can
be seen in the capital-output ratio graph.
19given level of variation in capital intensity implies more variation in output for obvious reasons.
What, then, does one learn from our experiments?
Finance changes the relationship between capital intensity and output for independent
reasons. In our model, the allocation channel almost doubles the predicted ratio of output
variation to capital intensity variation. This implies that the technological parameter changes
one needs in order to generate all the observed dispersion of output across countries are much
smaller. To illustrate this, consider once again an economy where all agents are homogenous,
and lower the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor from 1 to 0.75. The results
are shown in the bottom half of ¯gure 3. Although the output e®ect is (marginally) higher
than in the Cobb-Douglas case with homogenous agents, the ratio of output variation to
capital-output variation is almost unchanged. By contrast, when agents are heterogeneous
and the allocation channel is operative, lowering the elasticity of substitution to 0:75 doubles
the ratio of output variation to capital-output variation (the ratio goes from 0.7 to 1.5). Put
another way, a given change in the elasticity substitution raises output variation by a much
larger amount when ¯nancial disruptions are explicitly modeled. Therefore, our experiments
not only show that both channels emphasized by the ¯nancial development literature are
quantitatively important, but they also show that the deviations one needs from standard
technological assumptions in order to account for all the observed variation in output are
smaller when one models ¯nancial disruptions explicitly.
4.6 Finance and capital intensity
The model with heterogenous agents appears to predict too much variation in capital-output
ratios relative to ¯nancial di®erences, and correspondingly, given that the opportunity cost
of capital is the same across economies, too much variation in capital income shares of GDP.
In the data, capital income shares vary much less.27 But this ¯nding depends on one's
interpretation of the part of aggregate savings, S, that is not used in production by managers.
27See, again, Gollin (2002), Caselli (2003), or Cole, Ohanian, Riascos, and Schmitz (2004) for a comparison
between the U.S. and Latin American countries.
20If S ¡ K is interpreted as including residential investment and part of other non-equipment
investment, parts of it should be treated as investment according to standard National Income
and Product accounting, and the returns to these investment (possibly imputed returns in
the case of residential investment) should be part of GDP. On the other hand, money hoarded
by households or, more simply, unreported investments should not be treated as investment
because they are not accounted as so by national accounts.28
Assume that fraction ° of S ¡ K quali¯es as investment according to standard NIPA
principles. In this case, the adequate counterpart in our model for capital as we measured it in
the data section is K+°(S¡K), while the appropriate counterpart for GDP is Y +°(S¡K)r.
Figure 8 plots the quantitative impact of this rede¯nition of domestic capital and output
assuming, by way of illustration that ° = 0:5, versus the benchmark (° = 0). The allocation
channel now matters much more than before: output dispersion is almost unchanged, but
capital-output ratios vary much less than before. Given the behavior of the capital-output
ratio, capital shares of GDP now vary very little across countries. In the Cobb-Douglas case,
the dispersion in output falls short of that in the data, but as before, this can be remedied
by lowering the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. This produces a world
with as much dispersion in output as in the data, despite comparatively small di®erences in
capital-output ratios and capital income shares. In short, we have a model of development
driven by ¯nancial disruptions that quantitatively matches key development facts.
5 Conclusion
Our quantitative experiments attempt to ¯ll what we think is a gap in the literature. Empirical
economists have emphasized the strong statistical relationship between ¯nancial development
and economic development. A number of theories have been developed that establish a
28In that sense, the appropriate data counterpart for K may be equipment investment plus the part of
non-equipment investment that contributes to productive activities. Then, the sensitivity of K
Y to ¯nancial
di®erences is less problematic. DeLong and Summers (1991) calculate that equipment investment rates vary
much more across countries than overall investment rates.
21qualitative connection between ¯nance and development. But neither approach can inform
us on the quantitative importance of ¯nance. We ask whether di®erences in the quantity
of ¯nancial intermediation can account for cross-country di®erences in output and in capital
intensity, and ¯nd that they can.
In our model, better ¯nancial markets raise output by increasing the capital used in pro-
duction (the capital intensity channel) and by directing capital to its best uses (the allocation
channel). Our calibrated exercises suggest that both channels are quantitatively important.
However, under a unitary factor elasticity of substitution, ¯nancial frictions alone cannot
generate all the observed dispersion in output across countries and account for the fact that
output varies much more than capital intensity across countries. Lowering the elasticity of
substitution between capital and labor from 1 to 0.75, or 0.5, increases the impact of ¯nance
on output, without changing the role of capital intensity much. Raising the capital share
above standard values has a similar impact.
We ¯nd, in fact, that ¯nancial disruptions make the impact of changes in the parameters
that govern technological opportunities much greater. Put another way, when the role of
¯nance is explicitly modeled, deviations from standard technological assumptions needed to
account for the observed dispersion in output become much smaller.
Our model can also be extended to include other potential functions of the ¯nancial
system. In particular, we ignore the role the ¯nancial system plays in alleviating informational
frictions.29 Incorporating those features should help us better understand the role of ¯nance
in development. Whether doing this will alter our basic quantitative ¯ndings is unclear. Our
quantitative analysis encompasses the two extreme cases of ¯nancial development: complete
markets and pure self-¯nancing. Moreover, in order to quantify the importance of these
informational frictions, they must ¯rst be calibrated. We believe observed di®erences in
the organization of production to be the natural disciplining benchmark when quantifying
disruptions in the allocation of productive resources. Similar benchmarks will have to be
provided for informational frictions.
29For such an exercise see Erosa and Hidalgo (2004).
22A Proofs
A.1 Proof of lemma 1
Rewrite the managers' problem as:
V (a;z;´;w) = max
s·a;d¸0
¦(s + d;z;w)
s:t: ©(s;d;z;´;w) ¸ 0;
where ©(s;d;z;´;w) ´ ´ [¦(s + d;z;w) + s(1 + r)] ¡ (1 ¡ ´)d(1 + r): As in the text, let
s(a;z;´;w) and d(a;z;´;w) be the solutions to the above problem and de¯ne a¤(z;´;w) =
inffa : s(a;z;´;w) + d(a;z;´;w) = k¤(z;w)g. If a¤(z;´;w) = 0, the lemma holds trivially.
So assume that a¤(z;´;w) > 0 and ¯x a < a¤(z;´;w). Start with item (ii). From the envelope
theorem, V2 = ¦2 + ¸©2 > 0, where ¸ ¸ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the
incentive compatibility constraint. Next, necessary and su±cient30 conditions for a solution
to the constrained maximization problem above are:
¦1(s + d;z;w) + ¸©2(s;d;z;´;w) = 0 (A.1)
¸©(s;d;z;´;w) = 0 (A.2)
¦1(s + d;z;w) + ¸©1(s;d;z;´;w) ¡ º = 0 (A.3)
º(a ¡ s) = 0 (A.4)
where º ¸ 0 is the multiplier associated with the constraint s · a. (A.1) and (A.3) imply
¸(©1 ¡ ©2) = º. Since a < a¤(z;´;w), the manager is borrowing constrained, i.e. ¦1(s +
d;z;w) > 0 at the a solution. But A.1 then implies ¸ > 0 and ©2 < 0. Di®erentiation of
© shows that ©1 > 0 when ´ > 0. Since ©2 < 0, it now follows that º > 0 for constrained
agents, hence s = a by (A.4). This establishes item (iii) of the lemma.
To show part (iv), note that for constrained agents ©(a;d(a;z;´;w);z;´;w) = 0 in a
neighborhood of a. Di®erentiating with respect to a yields ©1+©2
@d




because ©1 > 0 and ©2 < 0 for constrained agents. For strict concavity, di®erentiating with

















But di®erentiation of © shows that ©12 = ©11 = ©22 = ´¦11 < 0 for constrained agents. So
@2d
@a2 < 0, as claimed.
For item (i), use the envelope theorem to obtain V1(a;z;´;w) = º > 0;. To show strict
30These conditions are su±cient because © is concave.
23concavity, note that V11(a;z;´;w) = @º



















All we need to insure is that @¸



















Finally, to establish item (v), di®erentiating the incentive compatibility constraint w.r.t z
yields ©3 + ©2
@d
@z = 0. Thus, @d
@z = ¡
©3
©2 > 0; as ©3 > 0, and ©2 < 0 for constrained agents.
A.2 Proof of proposition 2
First note that ED(¢;´) is upper-hemicontinuous non-empty and convex valued for all ´ 2
[0;1]. Indeed, by the theorem of the maximum, the set of optimal policies for agents of each
managerial ability z is non-empty and varies upper-hemicontinuously with w. Because ¹ has
¯nite support, the integrals in the de¯nition of ED are ¯nite sums. It follows that ED is
non-empty and upper-continuous. Since di®erent agent of ability z(´;w) can be assigned to
di®erent occupations, ED is also convex-valued. Now, for w high enough ED(w;´) ½ I R¡ for
all ´ 2 [0;1] since ¹ has bounded support. A standard application of Kakutani's ¯xed point
theorem now implies that a positive steady state exists provided ED(w;´)\I R+ 6= ; for w low
enough when ½ ¸ 0. That this is true when ½ = 1 (the linear case) is obvious. So it su±ces
to show that when ½ 2 [0;1), limw!0 d(0;z;´;w) > 0 for all ´ > 0 and z > 0. Indeed, this
implies that l(z;´;w) grows without bound while z(´;w) goes to zero as w becomes small.
To show that limw!0 d(0;z;´;w) > 0 for all ´ > 0 and z > 0 when ½ 2 [0;1), notice that for
all (z;´;w), d(0;z;´;w) is the unique solution to:
d(0;z;´;w) =
´
(1 ¡ ´)(1 + r)
¦(d;z;w):
When ½ 2 [0;1), simple algebra shows that
¦(d;z;w)
d diverges to +1 as d becomes small for
all z 2 Z and w > 0. (When ½ < 0,
¦(d;z;w)
d does not diverge as d becomes small. Indeed,
¦1(d;z;w) converges to a ¯nite constant when d converges to zero.) So, whenever ´ > 0 and
½ ¸ 0, limw!0 d(0;z;´;w) > 0 and we are done.
24B Calibration details
B.1 Managerial share
As explained in the text, when ´ = ¾ = 1, the managerial share of output is the ratio of
managerial income to the sum of payments to physical capital, labor, and the managerial
input. We obtain an empirical counterpart to this ratio using sole proprietorship tax data.
For sole proprietorships, gross payments to capital, labor and the sole proprietor are
business receipts minus all payments to intermediate inputs plus taxes paid. We calculate
payments to intermediate inputs as Cost of Sales and Operations net of Cost of Labor + Sup-
plies + Travel + Utilities + Advertising. Taxes paid need to be allocated to the three factors.
Sole proprietors may deduct state and local income taxes, sales taxes, employment taxes, one
half of their self-employment tax, personal property, and real estate taxes. We assume that
these taxes accrue to the various sectors in proportion to overall factor shares. Then the ratio
of payments to the sole proprietor to payments to other inputs can be approximated by the
ratio of net income to business receipts minus payments to intermediate inputs minus taxes
paid. Manufacturing sole proprietorship data available from the IRS then yields:
(1) Business (2) Payments (3) (4) (4) /
Year Receipts to intermediate inputs Taxes paid Net Income [(1)-(2)-(3)]
1989 25,400,029 10,499,808y 332,950 3,228,762 0.222
1990 21,839,350 7,957,673y 343,016 2,467,377 0.182
1991 23,354,542 8,920,086y 360,103 2,595,448 0.184
1992 27,243,502 10,934,325y 579,542 3,508,402 0.223
1993 27,157,994 11,228,291 559,901 3,216,585 0.209
1994 32,928,845 13,966,846 649,892 3,927,951 0.215
1995 32,101,683 13,662,657 617,056 4,143,519 0.232
1996 32,057,221 13,247,790 592,845 4,377,188 0.240
1997 32,057,221 13,425,659 593,115 3,941,135 0.218
1998 27,327,211 12,988,688 430,230 3,608,920 0.259
Note: All ¯gures in thousands of dollars. Data are from Internal Revenue Service, Sole Proprietorship Tax Sta-
tistics - Manufacturing Sole Proprietorships - General (http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=96754,00.html.)
y The IRS did not provide the cost of supplies between and 1989 and 1992. We impute it using its average
ratio to receipts during the other six years.
B.2 Distribution of managerial talent
Given all parameters, steady state equilibria can be computed using standard techniques. For
each set of exogenous parameters, we guess a wage, compute optimal policies for all agents by
backward induction, and then update our wage guess until the labor market approximately
clears. In all our quantitative experiments, the approximate equilibrium wage proved unique
(speci¯cally, the aggregate excess demand for labor function we computed proved monotonic).
In this section we make more precise the procedure we use to calibrate the parameters of the
distribution of managerial talent, and the degree ´ to which contracts can be enforced.
25We assume that managerial talent is log-normally distributed with location parameter
¸1 and dispersion parameter ¸2 > 0. Given ¸1 and ¸2, we use a discretized version of the




¢2 : i = 1;2:::100g.
In particular, the density of mass points is higher near the origin, as we found that doing
this improved the precision of the algorithm. Letting F(¸1;¸2;¢) denote the cumulative














with the convention that z0 = 0 and that z101 = +1.
Holding all other parameters ¯xed, denote by ¹ n(¸1;¸2;´), and Á(¸1;¸2;´) the average
size of establishments and the fraction of employment in establishments with fewer than 50
employees in equilibrium given ¸1; ¸2; and ´. Let ´(¸1;¸2) be the value for ´ such that
the equilibrium ratio of loans to gross yearly output is 2 given ¸1 and ¸2. Our calibration
objective is to choose ¸1 and ¸2 so that:
¹ n(¸1;¸2;´(¸1;¸2)) = 50 (B.1)
and Á(¸1;¸2;´(¸1;¸2)) = 0:50 (B.2)
We meet those goals using a downhill simplex method31 to minimize:
[50 ¡ ¹ n(¸1;¸2;´(¸1;¸2))]
2 + [50 ¡ 100Á(¸1;¸2;´(¸1;¸2))]
2
In all our experiments, we were able to meet our two calibration targets almost exactly. Fur-
thermore, even drastic changes in initial conditions (the coordinates of the initial simplex) led
to the same results suggesting that despite the complexity of the mapping between parame-
ters and ¹ n and Á, solutions to (B.1-B.2) are unique. The following table shows the resulting
parameters in all our experiments.
Benchmark Low ¯ Low º High º High ® Low ® ¾ = 0:75 ¾ = 0:50

















® 0.35 0.35 0.33 0.37 0.47 0.24 0.35 0.35
º 0.85 0.85 0.80 0.90 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85
± 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
´ 0.475 0.475 0.419 0.531 0.391 0.587 0.475 0.475
¾ 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.75 0.5
¸1 -2.404 -2.148 -3.819 -3.917 -4.443 -2.194 -2.342 -2.386
¸2 0.857 0.612 1.556 0.317 2.312 0.469 0.858 0.862
Note: We set the normalization parameter A to 30 in all experiments.
31Our C routine uses Amoeba.c from Numerical Recipes.
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31Figure 3: Homogenous agents
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32Figure 4: Di®erent managerial shares
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33Figure 5: Low propensity to save
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34Figure 6: Di®erent capital shares
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35Figure 7: Di®erent elasticities of substitution
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36Figure 8: Broad de¯nition of capital
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